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The aim of the study is to investigate whether discrimination factors exist within professional football 
clubs, concerning the management of their human capital, by analysing the correlation between the 
footballers’ wages and their performance. An analysis was conducted to show that discrimination, 
based both on nationality and race, can affect the strategies adopted by football club managers and in 
the professional footballer labour market, where players are considered to be the human capital of 
football enterprises. The research framework consists of an analysis of the existing literature on 
discrimination in sports and of a quantitative analysis based on an exploratory approach, where the 
wage differences among Italian Serie A league footballers are compared to the performance of each 
group of players (organised by race or nationality). The results of the analysis of data for all Italian Serie 
A clubs show that discrimination (in pay) exists against Italian and white players. In contrast, when 
small and big clubs are considered separately, the findings relating to small clubs highlight that foreign 
and black players face such discrimination. The results suggest that managers of professional football 
clubs apply a discrimination strategy. In addition, the results provide practical implications on the types 
of discrimination errors that are committed by the management of big and small football clubs. Big 
clubs tend to overrate the contributions of foreign and/or black players compared to those of Italian and 
white players, while small clubs tend to overrate the contributions of Italian and white players compared 
to those of foreign and black players. To reduce discrimination, clubs have to correlate how much 
players are paid with their performance. Further research is recommended to identify the impact of 
wage inequality on the football labour market and on professional team management. 
 
Key words: Human capital, discrimination, wages differences, performance, team management, labour market, 
football clubs. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
According to many studies on sports teams, leagues, and 
federations, the global  sports  industry  is  growing  much 
faster than gross domestic product (GDP) rates around 
the world, and football remains the main sports business 
 
*Corresponding author. Email: a.lardo@unicas.it 
 
Authors agree that this article remain permanently open access under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
License 4.0 International License 
 
 
 
 
in terms of global revenues, with an annual income of 
more than 20 billion euros (Collignon et al., 2011). 
Some researchers (Beech and Chadwick, 2004; 
Sšderman and Dolles, 2013) highlight that football, from 
being a simple sports competition, has become a sports-
related environment (Shams and Lombardi, 2016) 
connected to a complex set of economic, social, and 
political structures and with huge cultural and financial 
impact. 
In this context, the aim of the study is to investigate 
whether discrimination factors exist within professional 
football clubs, concerning the management of their 
human capital (Dana et al., 2005; Reisi et al., 2013; 
Shammot, 2014; Owor, 2016) by analysing the 
correlation between the footballers’ wages and their 
performance (Makris et al., 2012). 
Footballers represent the human capital in this type of 
enterprise (Tomé et al., 2014; Lardo et al., 2017), and, 
from this perspective, there are very few studies on 
management strategies that are based on conscious 
and/or unconscious discrimination on the part of 
professional football clubs in the pursuit of their aims, 
such as increase attendance, profitability, and chances of 
winning. 
The issue of discrimination is of serious concern to the 
governing bodies of football movements at both the 
European and global levels. During the XXXVII Ordinary 
Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) 
Congress held in London in May 2013, the UEFA and its 
member associations adopted a resolution to achieve its 
objective of eliminating racial discrimination within 
football. This initiative brought significant financial support 
to Football Against Racism in Europe (FARE). The UEFA 
and FARE are working together to stage events and 
publish materials, and they have also sent out a message 
of zero tolerance against all forms of racism and 
discrimination, and have instead promoted respect for 
diversity during Europe’s biggest football matches. 
For this reason, one purpose of the research is to 
contribute to the debate arising in the international sports 
landscape (Dongfeng, 2013; Hrisanta et al., 2013; 
Ukpere and Slabbert, 2009). The research focused on 
analysing discrimination based on race or country of 
origin in the professional football players’ labour market. 
The analysis was carried out on a group representing 
90% of Italian Serie A football players over the 2010 to 
2011, 2011 to 2012, and 2012 to 2013 seasons. The 
results of the research provide important implications in 
terms of the behaviour of professional football club 
managers, whose strategies can be influenced by 
systematic errors arising from discrimination at a 
conscious and/or unconscious level. In light of the 
arguments presented in this section, the research 
questions are: 
 
RQ1: Does discrimination based on nationality and/or 
race affect management strategies concerning the  human 
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capital of Italian football clubs? 
 
RQ2: Does a relationship exist between discriminatory 
behaviour against football players and strategies 
implemented by football clubs? 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Studies on discrimination in sports can be organised 
according to the sports discipline and forms of 
discrimination (Eitzen and Sage, 1978). With regards to 
sports, numerous studies have been carried out on 
baseball and basketball in the USA, albeit they have 
produced mixed results. 
Looking at baseball, Medoff (1975) and Raimondo 
(1983) found no statistically significant differences in the 
wage distribution of black and white players. However, in 
studying the salaries and premiums of 212 non-pitchers, 
Christiano (1986) noted that, in some cases, the 
premiums paid to older players were influenced by race. 
In a second study, however, Christiano (1988) concluded 
that the discrimination that was found from the analysis of 
the 1977 season was not found for the subsequent 
season. 
Bellemore (2001) surveyed the years from 1960 to 
1990, and found that while there were established forms 
of discrimination against black players, they diminished 
during the seasons when there was an increase in the 
number of teams taking part in the most important 
leagues. On the basis of Major League Baseball official 
data for black baseball batsmen between 1990 and 2004, 
Groothuis and Hill (2008) did not detect any significant 
correspondence between their race and the length of their 
careers. 
On the other hand, several conflicting results have been 
detected in the sector of professional basketball. In 
various empirical studies, it has been shown that, given 
the same level of productivity, black players are paid less 
than white players (Kahn and Sherer, 1988). In this 
regard, Bodvarsson and Brastow (1999), in their empirical 
study based on Becker (1971) approach, concluded that 
the level of racial discrimination in the National Basketball 
League has lowered as a result of the loss of monopoly in 
1988, when new teams joined the league. 
In other studies (Kanazawa and Funk, 2001), the 
difference in wages for black players has been linked to 
the greater number of spectators who, apparently, attend 
matches with more white players. This tendency results in 
white players’ wages marginally exceeding those of black 
players. Brown et al. (1991) found no empirical evidence 
to support the assumption that fan attendance is inversely 
proportional to the minutes of a game during which black 
basketball players play, reaching the conclusion that black 
players must perform better than white players in order to 
join the National Basketball Association. While the theme 
of racial  discrimination  has  been  widely  investigated  in 
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North American basketball and baseball leagues, only a 
small part of the literature has dealt with the impact of 
racial discrimination in American football and in 
football/soccer. 
Mogull (1981) carried out several studies concerning 
wage discrimination in the National Football League (NFL) 
in the United States of American (USA), and found no 
empirical evidence supporting wage discrimination among 
NFL players. Kahn (1991) conducted a survey on a 
sample of over 1000 players for the 1989-90 season, and 
from the results of his statistical regression, he concluded 
that the wages of African-American football players are 
4% lower than those of white players. Gius and Johnson 
(1998), in their analysis of the NFL, identified the first case 
of wage discrimination against white players. They used 
log-linear wage regression and the Chow test on a sample 
of 938 players for the 1995 to 1996 season and observed 
that white players were paid 10% less than African-
American players. 
Referring to racial discrimination in professional football 
in Europe and, particularly, within the English Premier 
League, Maguire (1988) noted that many black English 
players experienced explicit and/or implicit discrimination. 
In his analysis of data from the Rothmans Football 
League Directories, he concluded that, during the 1985 to 
1986 season, there was discrimination within English 
football. 
Based on his analysis of data from 39 football clubs 
over the seasons from 1978 to 1993, Szymanski (2000) 
confirmed that discrimination was present in English 
professional football, which the market was unable to 
avoid. He highlighted one important result—on average, a 
club without black players paid a premium of 5% 
compared to a club that did not discriminate. In other 
words, racial discrimination is more expensive for clubs at 
the top of the ranking, because the total expenditure for 
players is higher. 
In a further study, Preston and Szymanski (2000) 
investigated the cause of racial discrimination in English 
football for the seasons between 1974 and 1993 and 
found no evidence of a link between selecting black 
players and match attendance, concluding that 
discrimination can be attributed to the prejudice of some 
club owners. Frick (2007) found a slight and insignificant 
form of wage discrimination against foreign footballers. 
In another study, an innovative test was used to 
evaluate discrimination in English football and the effect of 
race on the probability of a player joining the market from 
1968 to 2001 (Goddard and Wilson, 2009). The results of 
the test revealed that the most talented black players were 
likely to be hired in clubs belonging to the highest 
divisions, and that talented black players had less 
probability of becoming professional players than white 
players. 
In a further study, Dobson and Goddard (2011) 
highlighted that racial discrimination has decreased in 
English professional football over the years, concluding 
that   discrimination   may  have  remained  because  of  a 
 
 
 
 
continuing distortion in the market for black footballers. 
Other studies (Frick et al., 2003) have analysed the 
relation between pay inequality and economic outcomes 
in the North American team sports industry, and the 
results differed considerably between the four major 
leagues, suggesting that the relative importance of high-
powered incentives and cooperation in football and 
hockey differed from that in basketball and baseball. 
This review of previous studies shows that no results 
can emphatically support (or reject) the existence of 
discrimination in sports in general and in professional 
football in particular. Moreover, many studies do not 
investigate whether professional football clubs apply 
discriminatory strategies to achieve their objectives. 
From this perspective, it is clear that there is a lack of 
research on the correlation between forms of 
discrimination against football players and the strategies 
implemented by football clubs. To help address this gap in 
the research and the absence of results in the 
international literature that can be interpreted univocally, 
in this study, we investigated discrimination’s role in 
influencing wages of premier league Italian footballers for 
the 2010 to 2011, 2011 to 2012, and 2012 to 2013 
seasons, and how discriminatory behaviour can be related 
to the strategies of football clubs. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The research used a quantitative method (Anderson et al., 2012; 
Waters, 2008), applying an exploratory approach (Hair et al. 2003) to 
answer the research questions identified in the previous section and, 
therefore, to fill the gap in literature. First, the analysis was based on 
the hypothesis that there is a positive linear correlation between the 
total wages paid in a professional football club and the team’s 
performance. This is given by the formula: 
 
P = f (W) 
 
Where 
 
W represents the total cost of salaries, and 
P is the team’s annual performance. 
 
The hypothesis, which has been supported in other works 
concerning British football (Szymanski, 2010), was verified for the 
Italian market. Figure 1 shows that this correlation exists to a 
moderate degree (Pearson’s coefficient is equal to 0.71) for the 
seasons surveyed. 
As in other studies, the performance values were calculated using 
the natural logarithm of the logit function applied to the points won by 
a team out of the total points available. The values of the total cost of 
wages were calculated as the natural logarithm of the ratio between 
the total cost of wages for each team and the average for the current 
season. Over the three championships, the Pearson’s coefficient 
was estimated as 0.75 for the first and second seasons and 0.69 for 
the third. 
 
 
Theoretical discrimination hypothesis 
 
To understand the methodology used in this survey, a theoretical 
discrimination hypothesis is needed. 
Assuming that each team is composed of n players—na players 
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Figure 1. Correlation (wages; performance) for Italian Serie A football clubs (Source: 
Authors’ analysis using SPSS). 
 
 
 
have a certain characteristic and nb players do not—the formula is: 
 
N = Na + Nb 
 
Where 
 
N represents the total number of football players, 
Na represents the share of players with the given characteristic 
(Na/N), 
PN represents the team’s overall performance, and 
PNa represents the contribution of group A to this performance. 
 
Hp: If it is possible to demonstrate statistically that, in a given 
season, teams with a higher Na performed better, it should follow 
that the average of the wages of group A players (μa) should be 
significantly higher than the averages of the wages of group B 
players (μb). 
 
From this perspective, there should be no discrimination if: 
 
(1) The positive impact on performance by group A determines a 
higher retribution, on average, 
(2) The insignificant impact on performance by group A does not 
determine any difference in retribution, and 
(3) The negative impact on performance by group A determines a 
significant difference in retribution in favour of group B. 
 
In contrast, there is evidence of discrimination if: 
 
(1) The positive impact on performance by group A does not 
determine any difference in retribution or determines a significant 
difference in retribution in favour of group B (discrimination against 
A), 
(2) The negative impact on performance by group A does not 
determine any difference in retribution to the detriment of A or 
determines a difference in retribution in its favour (discrimination 
against B), and 
(3) The insignificant impact on performance by group A determines a 
difference in retribution in its favour (discrimination against B) or a 
difference in retribution in favour of B (discrimination against A). 
 
Figure 2 summarises all the cases hypothesised. The analysis was 
carried out on two characteristics (race and nationality) over three 
consecutive seasons (2010 to 2011, 2011 to 2012, and 2012 to 
2013) and with reference to all the championship teams (T), the 
cluster of big teams (B), and that of small teams (S). Table 1 shows 
the cases that were subjected to critical analysis. 
For the calculation of the means, a sample survey was carried 
out, since the data concerning the retributions of all players in group 
A was incomplete. This meant that it was possible to accept or 
refuse the hypothesis for equality of the means, referring to the 
wages of footballers belonging to the categories surveyed. 
The comparison between the average retributions was carried out 
starting from the players’ individual wages. It was not possible to use 
this approach to estimate the contribution of group A members to the 
team’s performance. The contribution of group A to performance 
could not be calculated as the sum of the contributions of each 
member in group A to the team’s performance mainly for two 
reasons: 
 
(1) Nowadays, there is no suitably reliable and general indicator of a 
footballers’ individual performance that can be applied to every 
position covered on the pitch, and 
(2) A team’s performance cannot always be defined as the simple 
sum of the performances of every footballer. 
 
Therefore, in the present study, the contribution to team 
performance by each footballer was determined by allocating to 
each a share of the team’s result according to the number of 
matches the footballer played during the seasons under 
examination; therefore, group-specific performance was considered.
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Figure 2. Theoretical discrimination hypothesis. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Symbols for cases that were analysed to determine discrimination behaviour. 
 
Symbol Description 
2010-11 (T/F) Foreign footballers investigated in the 2010-11 season with reference to all clubs 
2010-11 (B/F) Foreign footballers investigated in the 2010-11 season with reference to big clubs 
2010-11 (S/F) Foreign footballers investigated in season 2010-11 season with reference to small clubs 
2010-11 (T/C) Black footballers investigated in the 2010-11 season with reference to all clubs 
2010-11 (B/C) Black footballers investigated in the 2010-11 season with reference to big clubs 
2010-11 (S/C) Black footballers investigated in the 2010-11 season with reference to small clubs 
2011-12 (T/F) Foreign footballers investigated in the 2011-12 season with reference to all clubs 
2011-12 (B/F) Foreign footballers investigated in the 2011-12 season with reference to big clubs 
2011-12 (S/F) Foreign footballers investigated in the 2011-12 season with reference to small clubs 
2011-12 (T/C) Black footballers investigated in the 2011-12 season with reference to all clubs  
2011-12 (B/C) Black footballers investigated in the 2011-12 season with reference to big clubs 
2011-12 (S/C) Black footballers investigated in the 2011-12 season with reference to small clubs 
2012-13 (T/F) Foreign footballers investigated in the 2012-13 season with reference to all clubs 
2012-13 (B/F) Foreign footballers investigated in the 2012-13 season with reference to big clubs 
2012-13 (S/F) Foreign footballers investigated in the 2012-13 season with reference to small clubs 
2012-13 (T/C) Black footballers investigated in the 2012-13 season with reference to all clubs  
2012-13 (B/C) Black footballers investigated in the 2012-13 season with reference to big clubs  
2012-13 (S/C) Black footballers investigated in the 2012-13 season with reference to small clubs 
 
 
 
Empirical analysis framework 
 
The research was carried following two steps: 
 
(1) The first step consisted of analysing the annual wages of a group 
of Serie A football players divided by nationality and race, with 
reference to the 2010 to 2011, 2011 to 2012, and 2012 to 13 
seasons. To carry out this analysis, we used a database provided by 
the Gazzetta dello Sport, the leading Italian sports newspaper. 
(2) The second step consisted of comparing the footballers’ wages 
with the team’s performance in matches played by the footballers. 
For data relating to attendance and team performance, we used the 
database available through the transfer market website, 
http://www.transfermarkt.com. 
 
With regards to the first step, it is important to specify that the 
group of players was selected from among all the footballers who 
played in at least ten matches over each season analysed. This 
group is representative of about 90% of the total population of 
footballers who played at least one game over each season. 
Since there is a significant correlation between the level of the 
footballers’ net wages and their clubs’ total expenditure on wages 
(the Pearson’s coefficient for the three championships was 
estimated as 0.75 for the first and second seasons and 0.69 for the 
third), the virtual population was divided into two subgroups—big 
and small clubs. Small clubs are clubs that spend less than 30 
million euros on their players’ wages annually. Table 2 shows the 
composition of the football clubs in terms of the two football features
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Table 2. Composition of footballer groups. 
 
2010-11 season  2011-12 season  2012-13 season 
Variable 
Small 
clubs 
Big 
clubs 
All 
clubs 
 Small 
clubs 
Big 
clubs 
All 
clubs 
 Small 
clubs 
Big 
clubs 
All 
clubs 
Italian players (I) 125 73 198  128 60 188  127 45 172 
Foreign players (F) 93 67 160  95 86 181  107 75 182 
Total 218 140 358  223 146 369  234 120 354 
            
Black players (C) 25 20 45  22 19 41  27 22 49 
White players (W) 193 120 313  201 127 328  207 98 305 
Total 218 140 358  223 146 369  234 120 354 
 
 
 
µall-5% µall+5%µall
 
 
 
Figure 3. Range used for comparing mean value of footballers’ wages. 
 
 
 
being analysed. 
The analysis of the groups involved comparing the mean of the 
wages of footballers belonging to the groups. The difference 
between the means of groups A and B is significant if it is 5% above 
the mean of all players (Figure 3). In practice, the value of the range 
is calculated as the difference between 5% more and 5% less than 
the mean for all players. 
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Evidence from first step 
 
Applying the methodology explained in the previous 
section, Table 3 gives the results for the population of all 
the Serie A clubs for the three seasons. With reference to 
nationality, for all the seasons, the mean of the retribution 
for foreigner footballers was higher than that for Italian 
players, and all the differences in the means were 
significant because they were greater than the 5% range. 
The result was the same with reference to race of 
footballers, except for the 2012 to 2013 season, when 
there was a relevant reduction in the wage gap, as 
indicated by the insignificance in the differences. When 
foreign footballers received a higher wage than their 
Italian counterparts, it can be explained through the 
specific characteristics of the Italian football labour 
market. Clubs are generally prepared to pay a premium to 
a foreign footballer based on the conviction that he will 
have a greater influence on the clubs’ results during that 
season. 
It is important to point out that the differences between 
the wages of black and white footballers and between 
Italian and foreign footballers decreased rapidly between 
the 2010 to 2011 and 2012 to 2013 seasons, and this 
reduction can be partially explained by the reduction in 
Italian football clubs’ total investment in talented players 
caused by the general economic situation. The analysis of 
the group of small clubs is summarised in Table 4. 
With reference to nationality, an opposite trend seemed 
to emerge, with the wages of Italian footballers constantly 
above those of other players. The difference was 
significant, however, only for the 2012 to 2013 season. In 
the 2012 to 2013 season, for the other characteristics 
under examination (race), there was an inversion in the 
trend—on average, the wages of white footballers were 
lower than those of black footballers. After analysing the 
significance of the wage difference, we found that this had 
occurred for the last two seasons. Table 5 presents the 
results of the analysis for the group of big clubs. 
Looking at the group of all Serie A clubs, the mean of 
the black players’ wages was higher than that of the white 
players. Similarly, the average of the wages of foreigner 
players was higher than that of Italian players, with the 
exception of the 2012 to 2013 season. Concerning 
nationality, in all seasons, the difference between the 
wage means for the groups of players was significant.  
In the 2012 to 2013 season, the wages of Italian players 
were, on average, higher than those of foreign players 
and the wages of black players were, on average, lower 
than those of white players. With reference to the latter 
group, in the 2012 to 2013 season, the difference 
between the two wage means was not greater than 5% of 
the mean of all players. 
In summary, the results of the first phase led to the 
following main conclusions: 
 
(1) In the 2010 to 2011 and 2011 to 2012 seasons, for all 
clubs and big clubs, there was a significant difference in
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Table 3. Results for all clubs (wages in millions of euros). 
 
Variable 
2010-11 season  2011-12 season 2012-13 season 
Pl. Mean Mean of all pl. 5% range  Pl. Mean Mean of all pl. 5% range Pl. Mean Mean of all pl. 5% range 
Foreign players 160 1.1259 - -  181 1.0773 - - 182 0.89 - - 
Italian players 198 0.8917 - -  188 0.7895 - - 172 0.801 - - 
Differences - 0.2342 0.9964 0.0996  - 0.288 0.9307 0.0931 - 0.089 0.8469 0.0847 
Black players 45 1.3638 - -  41 1.1471 - - 49 0.901 - - 
White players 313 0.9436 - -  328 0.9036 - - 305 0.838 - - 
Differences - 0.4202 0.9964 0.0996  - 0.244 0.9307 0.0931 - 0.0631 0.8468 0.0847 
 
 
 
Table 4. Results for group of small clubs (wages in millions of euros). 
 
Variable 
2010-11 season  2011-12 season  2012-13 season 
Pl. Mean Mean  of all pl. 5%  range  Pl. Mean Mean of all pl. 5% range  Pl. Mean Mean  of all pl. 5%  range 
Foreign players (F) 93 0.4543 - -  95 0.4062 - -  107 0.4175 - - 
Italian players  (I) 125 0.4545 - -  128 0.4338 - -  127 0.4672 - - 
Differences - -0.0002 0.4544 0.0454  - -0.0275 0.4220 0.0422  
 
-0.05 0.4445 0.0444 
Black players  (C) 25 0.4148 - -  22 0.3641 - -  27 0.4539 - - 
White players (W) 193 0.4595 - -  201 0.4284 - -  207 0.3726 - - 
Differences - -0.0447 0.4544 0.0454  - -0.064 0.4221 0.0422  - 0.0813 0.3820 0.0382 
 
 
 
Table 5. Results for group of big clubs (wages in millions of euros). 
 
Variable 
2010-11 season  2011-12 season  2012-13 season 
Pl. Mean Mean of all pl. 5% range  Pl. Mean Mean of all pl. 5 % range  Pl. Mean Mean of all pl. 5 % range 
Foreign players (F) 67 2.058 - -  86 1.818 - -  75 1.564 - - 
Italian players (I) 73 1.640 - -  60 1.548 - -  45 1.744 - - 
Differences - 0.418 1.840 0.184  - 0.27 1.708 0.1708  - -0.18 1.632 0.163 
Black players (C) 20 2.122 - -  19 2.054 - -  22 1.55 - - 
White players (W) 120 1.449 - -  127 1.656 - -  98 1.6498 - - 
Differences - 0.673 1.545 0.155  - 0.398 1.708 0.1708  - -0.0998 1.632 0.163 
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Table 6.  Index of impact on performance. 
 
Variable 
2010-2011 season  2011-2012 season  2012-2013 season 
Non-Italian players (S) Black players (C)  Non-Italian players (S) Black players(C)  Non-Italian players (S) Black players (C) 
All clubs (T) 0.51 0.71  0.07 0.36  0.31 0.38 
Small clubs (S) 0.32 0.49  0.16 0.44  0.50 0.61 
Big clubs (B) 0.73 0.89  -0.57 0.28  -0.81 -0.29 
 
 
 
the wage means in favour of foreign and black 
players, compared to Italian and white players; 
(2) In the 2011 to 2012 season, for small clubs, 
there was a significant difference between the 
wages of black and white players, in favour of 
white players; 
(3) In the 2012 to 2013 season, for big clubs, 
there was a significant difference in wage means 
in favour of foreigner players for all clubs, and in 
favour of Italian footballers; 
(4) In the 2012 to 2013 season, for both small and 
big clubs, there was a significant difference in 
wage means favouring foreigner players, 
compared to Italian footballers; 
(5) In the 2012 to 2013 season, for small clubs, 
there was a significant difference in wage means 
between black and white players, in favour of 
black footballers; 
(6) In all other cases, we were not able to verify 
any significant wage mean differences for the 
groups of footballers. 
 
 
Evidence from second step 
 
In the second step of the research, the study aim 
was to measure the contribution of each group to 
the performance of their clubs. 
An estimation was carried out on the impact of 
foreign and black players on the results of each 
team. This estimation first involved establishing 
the total number of the players present on the 
pitch for each team and, subsequently, calculating 
the share of performance/success that can be 
allocated to foreign and black players. 
Performance was determined as the share of 
points won in relation to the total points to be won 
throughout the 20-team championship. 
Based on the aforementioned data, the index of 
impact on performance was calculated as the 
Pearson’s coefficient between the share in 
attendance that can be attributed to foreign and 
black players, respectively, and the result 
achieved by their clubs over the three seasons. 
In terms of the first part of the research, the 
analysis was carried out after making the 
distinction between big and small clubs. Table 6 
shows the results of the analysis for the clubs in 
the Italian Premier League (Serie A) for the 2010 
to 2011, 2011 to 2012, and 2012 to 2013 
seasons. 
Of the 18 cases, 6 had an index that was greater 
or equal to 0.5 and 2 that had an index that was 
less than -0.5. This means that, in 8 of the 18 
cases, the higher number of foreign and black 
players seemed to have influenced the teams’ 
results, up to a point. In particular, for the 2010 to 
2011 season, foreign and black players had a 
significant influence on team performance, 
especially in big clubs. For the 2011 to 2012 
season, a radical change of direction took place, 
where in big clubs, an increase in foreigner 
players seemed to have caused a drop in team 
results. In the 2012 to 2013 season, more small 
clubs chose foreign players than the larger, richer 
clubs. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Having verified the hypothesis that, in Italian 
professional football, higher pay tends to 
correspond to better team performance, it should 
follow that, in the presence of a significant 
contribution by foreign and black players to club 
performance, these groups of players should 
receive a higher share of the clubs’ expenditure on 
wages. In Figure 4, the results relating to black 
and foreign players are classified according to the 
three seasons. 
The central column of the matrix shows the 
cases where the wage differences were not 
considered significant. With reference to the 
analysis by race group for the 2012 to 2013 
season, the insignificant contribution by black 
players to the teams’ performance corresponded 
to a non-significant difference in wages. We can, 
therefore, avoid any assumption that this is a case 
of discrimination. 
The first quadrant presents the results relating 
to black and foreign players for the 2010 to 2011 
season, with reference to all teams (T). In this 
case, there was no discrimination, because the
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Figure 4. Discrimination cases in all clubs. 
 
 
 
significant presence of black players (C) and foreign 
players (F) corresponded to a significant wage difference 
for the group (higher than the 5% range of the mean for all 
players). 
For the remaining cases, moderate discrimination was 
observed in the fourth quadrant, where significant wage 
differences existed in favour of black and foreign players 
and the higher wages for black and foreign players had no 
significant influence on the teams’ results. It can therefore 
be stated that there was moderate discrimination against 
white footballers for the 2011 to 2012 season, and against 
Italian footballers for the 2011 to 2012 and 2012 to 2013 
seasons. 
Subsequently, to focus the study analysis on the 
behaviour of big and small clubs, we investigated the two 
groups separately, and the results are clarified in Figure 
5.  
The results presented on Figure 5 show that, in Italy, 
the professional football labour market did not show any 
indication of discrimination in 67% (8 out of 12) of the 
cases, but it existed in 33% (4 out of 12) of the cases. 
According to the study analysis, this 33% included: 
 
(1) Two cases of moderate discrimination—one against 
white players and the other against Italian players, with 
reference to big and small clubs, respectively—for the 
2011 to 2012 season (that is, a significant wage 
difference was linked to an insignificant impact on the 
club’s performance); and 
(2) Two cases of strong discrimination—one against 
Italian players in big clubs for the 2011 to 2012 season 
(that is, a negative impact of the group of Italian players 
on performance corresponded to a significant wage 
difference in favour of foreign players), and the other 
against foreign players in small clubs for the 2012 to 
2013 season (that is, a  positive  impact  of  the  group  of 
foreign players on performance corresponded to higher 
wages for Italian players). 
 
Overall, the empirical analysis has identified the 
following: strong discrimination against Italian footballers 
for the 2011 to 2012 season with reference to big clubs, 
and strong discrimination against foreign players for the 
of 2012 to 2013 season with reference to small clubs; 
moderate discrimination against white footballers for the 
2011 to 2012 season with reference to all clubs and big 
clubs, against black players for the 2011 to 2012 season 
with reference to small clubs, and against Italian 
footballers for the 2012 to 2013 season with reference to 
all clubs. 
The findings of this study can be useful in future 
investigations on the possibility that the behaviour of 
professional football club managers is subject to 
systematic errors (Lombardi et al., 2014) that are related 
to some kind of conscious and/or unconscious 
discrimination (Ohlert, 2016). In addition, with regards to 
the difference between big and small clubs, there is 
evidence that big club managers make the same number 
of discrimination errors as small club managers. 
Interesting considerations can be made in connection 
with the types of error involved. Big clubs tend to 
overestimate the contribution of foreign and black players 
to the disadvantage of Italian and white players. In 
contrast, small clubs are inclined to overrate the 
contribution of Italian and white players to the 
disadvantage of foreign and black footballers. 
Focusing the study attention on the temporal 
distribution of the errors, we find that they were 
concentrated in the 2011 to 2012 and 2012 to 2013 
seasons, when the well-documented economic crisis 
started to affect the entire professional football sector 
(from  the  2011  to  2012  season  to  the  2012  to  2013 
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Figure 5. Discrimination cases for big and small clubs. 
 
 
 
season, the expenditure for wages dropped from 875.5 
million euros to 866.3 million euros). For the 2010 to 
2011 season, no evidence of discrimination was 
observed for any of the groups. It would appear, 
therefore, that in periods of crisis, discrimination 
processes tended to worsen.  
On the one hand, big clubs, despite reducing the wage 
differential between Italian and foreign footballers, 
continued to favour the international market, still 
acquiring players who were not able to bring a definitive 
competitive advantage (their contribution to their team’s 
performance was negative).  
On the other hand, small clubs worked harder in 
scouting the emerging markets, gaining the greatest profit 
from the difference in wages between foreign and black 
players and their contribution to the team’s performance, 
which tended to transform into an economic advantage. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this work was to investigate whether there are 
strategies that discriminate against human capital within 
professional football, particularly the Italian Football 
Premiership (Serie A), which is one of the top five 
European leagues. 
The analysis focused on the wages of Serie A 
footballers and involved three aspects. Wages were 
examined from the perspective of the players’ race and 
country of origin (perspective on the type of 
discrimination) over three consecutive seasons (temporal 
perspective) for all clubs in the league and, in a different 
way, for big and small clubs (perspective on the size of 
clubs in the league). 
As in  other  research  on  the  topic,  the study  used  a 
theoretical framework in which it was assumed that a 
positive correlation exists between a player’s wage level 
and the contribution of each category of players to the 
total performance of the club in which they play. 
Subsequently, we analysed the cases where there was a 
significant difference between the level of wages for the 
group and the contribution to the group’s performance. 
This inconsistency was interpreted as providing evidence 
of discrimination and was subjected to a critical 
examination to verify whether the reasons for this can be 
included among the possible strategies put in place by 
professional football club managers. 
The analysis produced the following main results. No 
systematic form of discrimination existed within the Italian 
Premier League, because discrimination factors were 
only identified in 33% of the cases. However, from the 
perspective of type of discrimination, we found evidence 
of discriminatory behaviour either to the advantage or 
disadvantage of the categories, verifying that big clubs 
tended to overrate the contribution of foreign and black 
players, to the disadvantage of Italian and white players, 
while small clubs tended to overrate the contribution of 
Italians and white players, to the disadvantage of foreign 
and black players. Considering all clubs, the impact of 
discriminatory behaviour on the part of big clubs was 
greater than that of small clubs. From the temporal 
perspective, there has been an increase in episodes of 
discrimination over the past two years, when, for the first 
time, league clubs reduced their total expenditure on 
wages. 
Furthermore, this research provided an answer to its 
second question, because it demonstrated that 
processes of discrimination were strictly connected to the 
strategies implemented by Italian football club managers 
and these differed according to the size of the club: 
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(1) Big clubs seemed to prefer famous foreign and black 
footballers, incurring high costs and paying large salaries, 
to increase their relational capital value (Trequattrini et 
al., 2014), exploit the effect of these negotiations in the 
media, and increase their income from stadium tickets, 
merchandising, and TV rights; and 
(2) Small clubs preferred to acquire unknown foreign and 
black footballers from emerging markets, containing costs 
and paying lower wages, to improve their financial 
performance by exploiting the potential future recognition 
of the players acquired. 
 
To avoid these discrimination strategies carried out by 
the managers of professional football clubs, there should 
be a higher correlation between the wages of players and 
their contribution to their team’s performance, and this 
correlation may be imposed by football bodies on football 
clubs (Trequattrini et al., 2015). 
Discrimination can be interpreted as a form of 
underhanded imperfection in the Italian footballer labour 
market, since it exists in the function of the economic 
objectives of the clubs in the industry. This consideration 
underlines the limits of the present research and opens 
the field to future analyses. If the hypothesis that 
discrimination is in the function of the strategic aims of 
professional football clubs is correct, it follows that wage 
differences between footballers should be correlated not 
only to their match performance, but also to the financial 
results of these clubs, putting into the discussion the 
theoretical models that assume that they have a single 
objective in the form of either maximising profits or 
maximising wins. 
Finally, the research has some limitations. First, a 
footballer’s performance is a complex variable that 
cannot be represented by one index, and future studies 
can aim to improve upon this aspect by considering other 
variables beyond match attendance. Moreover, the 
research focuses only on Italian Serie A clubs and it 
could be expanded considering all the European leagues. 
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